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Abstract7
Psychological theory is advanced through empirical tests of predictions derived from quantitative cognitive models.8
As cognitive models are developed and extended they tend to increase in complexity – leading to more precise9
predictions – which places concomitant demands on the behavioral data used to discriminate between candidate10
theories. To aid discrimination between cognitive models and, more recently, to constrain parameter estimation,11
neural data have been used as an adjunct to behavioral data, or as a central stream of information, in the evaluation12
of cognitive models. Such a model-based neuroscience approach entails many advantages, including precise tests13
of hypotheses about brain-behavior relationships. There have, however, been few systematic investigations of the14
capacity for neural data to constrain the recovery of cognitive models. Through the lens of cognitive models of15
speeded decision-making, we investigated the efficiency of neural data to aid identification of latent cognitive states16
in models fit to behavioral data. We studied two theoretical frameworks that differed in their assumptions about17
the composition of the latent generating state. The first assumed that observed performance was generated from a18
mixture of discrete latent states. The second conceived of the latent state as dynamically varying along a continuous19
dimension. We used a simulation-based approach to compare recovery of latent data-generating states in neurally-20
informed versus neurally-uninformed cognitive models. We found that neurally-informed cognitive models were more21
reliably recovered under a discrete state representation than a continuous dimension representation for medium effect22
sizes, although recovery was difficult for small sample sizes and moderate noise in neural data. Recovery improved23
for both representations when a larger effect size differentiated the latent states. We conclude that neural data aids24
the identification of latent states in cognitive models, but different frameworks for quantitatively informing cognitive25
models with neural information have different model recovery efficiencies. We provide full worked examples and26
freely-available code to implement the two theoretical frameworks.27
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1. Introduction29
Quantitative models that explicate the cognitive processes driving observed behavior are becoming increas-30
ingly complex, leading to finer-grained predictions for data. Although increasingly precise model predictions are31
undoubtedly a benefit for the field, they also increase the demands placed on data to discriminate between com-32
peting models. The predictions of cognitive models have traditionally been tested against behavioral data, which33
is typically limited to choices and/or response times. Such behavioral data have been extremely useful in discrim-34
inating between model architectures (e.g., Anderson et al., 2004; Brown and Heathcote, 2008; Forstmann et al.,35
2016; Nosofsky and Palmeri, 1997; Ratcliff and Smith, 2004; Shiffrin and Steyvers, 1997; Tversky and Kahneman,36
1992). As model predictions increase in precision, however, we approach a point where behavioral data have limited37
resolution to further constrain and discriminate between the processes assumed by the models of interest.38
The problem of behavioral data providing limited constraint is compounded when one aims to study non-39
stationarity. Cognitive models typically assume a stationary generative process whereby trials within an experi-40
mental condition are treated as independent and identically distributed random samples from a probabilistic model41
with a specified set of parameters. This assumption has proven extremely useful, both practically and theoretically,42
but is not supported by fine-grained empirical analysis (e.g., Craigmile et al., 2010; Wagenmakers et al., 2004).43
Recent work in the study of stimulus-independent thought, or mind wandering, provides a psychological mechanism44
that can explain these findings, at least in part, in terms of observed performance arising from two or more latent45
data-generating states. One prominent theory proposes that ongoing performance is driven by two distinct phases:46
perceptual coupling – where attentional processes are directed to incoming sensory input and completing the ongo-47
ing task – and perceptual decoupling – where attention is diverted from sensory information toward inner thoughts48
(for detailed review, see Smallwood and Schooler, 2015). The perceptual decoupling hypothesis of mind wandering49
proposes, therefore, that observed behavior is the end result of a mixture of discrete latent data-generating states.50
To gain insight into the processes underlying the phases of perceptual coupling and decoupling, the goal of the51
cognitive modeler is to use the available data to determine the optimal partition of trials into latent states.52
On the basis of behavioral data alone, such as choices and response times, reliably identifying discrete latent53
states can be difficult or near impossible. In an example of this approach, Vandekerckhove et al. (2008) aimed to54
identify contaminant trials – data points not generated by the process of interest – in a perceptual decision-making55
experiment. They defined a latent mixture model in a Bayesian framework that attempted to partition trials that56
were sampled from the (diffusion model) process of interest from contaminant trials distributed according to some57
other process. In attempting to segment trials to latent classes, the diffusion model was only informed by the same58
choice and response time data it was designed to fit. For a representative participant, only 0.6% of their 8000 trials59
were classified as contaminants, indicating either a remarkable ability of the participant to remain on task (which is60
unlikely; see, e.g., Killingsworth and Gilbert, 2010), or, more likely, to the limited ability of behavioral data alone61
to segment trials into latent states.62
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Rather than relying solely on behavioral data, here we examine whether augmenting cognitive models63
with an additional stream of information – such as neural data, whether that involves single cell recordings, EEG,64
MEG, or fMRI – aids identification of latent data-generating states underlying observed behavior. Our aim is to65
investigate whether the addition of neural data can improve our account of the behavioral data, and in particular66
the identification of latent states, rather than accounting for the joint distribution of behavioral and neural data67
(for joint modeling approaches, see Turner et al., 2013a). To this end, we condition on neural data; that is, we68
do not consider generative models of neural data. Rather, we explore tractable and simple methods that augment69
cognitive models using neural data as covariates in order to gain greater insight into cognition than is possible70
through consideration of behavioral data in isolation.71
Throughout the manuscript we position our work within the theoretical context of mind wandering. Over72
the past decade, the scientific study of mind wandering has received great interest from behavioral (e.g., Bastian and73
Sackur, 2013; Cheyne et al., 2009) and neural (e.g., Andrews-Hanna et al., 2010; Christoff et al., 2009; Weissman74
et al., 2006) perspectives, though there have been few attempts to integrate the two streams of information in75
a model-based cognitive neuroscience framework (for an exception, see Mittner et al., 2014). The study of mind76
wandering is particularly relevant to our aim of identifying latent cognitive states as it is a phenomenon that77
has been studied under various, qualitatively distinct, hypotheses about how latent states give rise to observed78
performance (Smallwood and Schooler, 2006, 2015), which we expand upon below. Mind wandering, therefore,79
serves as an excellent vehicle through which to demonstrate our methodological approach. Our working hypothesis80
is that mind wandering is a neural state or process that affects the parameters of cognitive models, which in turn81
affect observed behavioral performance (Hawkins et al., 2015). Our approach inverts this chain of causation: we82
fit behavioral data with cognitive models that are informed with neural data, and compare their fit to cognitive83
models that are not informed with neural data. This allows us to assess what can be learnt about mind wandering84
in a way that is not feasible without the discriminative power of the neural data.85
Through the lens of cognitive models of speeded decision-making, we consider two approaches that use86
neural data to constrain cognitive models, which in turn helps to identify both when people mind wander and the87
effect it has on task performance. We note, however, that our methods generalize to any domain of study that utilizes88
neural data – or any additional stream of data, for that matter – to aid identification of latent data-generating89
states and fit the behavioral data arising from those states with cognitive models.90
We consider two general approaches to incorporating mind wandering within a modeling framework. The91
first approach assumes that observed behavior arises from a mixture of discrete latent states, which may have par-92
tially overlapping or unique sets of data-generating parameters. We refer to this as the Discrete State Representation.93
One might think of the latent states as reflecting an on-task state, where attention is directed to external stimuli,94
or task-related thoughts, and an off-task state, where attention is directed to internal stimuli, or task-unrelated95
thoughts, similar to the perceptual decoupling hypothesis (Smallwood and Schooler, 2015). Alternatively, the latent96
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states might reflect executive control, where an executive system oversees maintenance of goal-directed behavior,97
and executive failure, which occurs when the executive control system fails to inhibit automatically cued internal98
thoughts that derail goal-directed behavior (McVay and Kane, 2010). Regardless of the labels assigned to the latent99
states, models assuming a discrete state representation aim to first identify the mutually exclusive latent states and100
then estimate partially overlapping or distinct sets of model parameters for the discrete states (for a similar ap-101
proach, see Mittner et al., 2014). We note that a discrete state representation is also considered outside the context102
of mind wandering. For example, Borst and Anderson (2015) developed a hidden semi-Markov model approach103
that used a continuous stream of EEG data to identify discrete stages of processing in associative retrieval.104
The second approach generalizes the discrete state representation, relaxing the assumption that latent states105
are mutually exclusive. This approach assumes a dynamically varying latent state where, for example, at all times106
a participant will fall at some point along a continuum that spans from a completely on-task focus through to a107
completely off-task focus. We refer to this second approach as the Continuous Dimension Representation, and it108
approximates ‘executive resource’ theories of mind wandering (e.g., Smallwood and Schooler, 2006; Teasdale et al.,109
1995). This class of theories states that executive resources are required to perform goal-directed tasks. The pool110
of resources is finite, and competing demands, such as mind wandering from the task at hand, reduce the resources111
available to complete the primary task, leading to suboptimal task performance. The resources available to complete112
a task can effectively be considered a continuous variable: at times there are more resources available to complete113
the task than others, and this can vary in potentially complex ways from one trial to the next. Models assuming114
a continuous dimension representation aim to regress single-trial measures of neural activity onto structured trial-115
by-trial variation in model parameters (for similar approaches, see Cavanagh et al., 2011; Frank et al., 2015; Nunez116
et al., 2015, in press). To the extent that the single-trial regressors index the latent construct of interest, this117
approach dynamically tracks the effect of neural fluctuations on changes in model parameters.118
We use a simulation-based approach to explore how well neural data constrains the identification of data-119
generating states when fitting cognitive models to behavioral data. We first simulate data from models that assume120
a non-stationary data-generating process (i.e., a latent cognitive state that changes throughout the course of an121
experiment). We then fit models to the synthetic data that vary in their knowledge of the latent data-generating122
states: some models completely ignore the presence of a latent mixture in data (i.e., they are misspecified), and123
others assume partial through to perfect knowledge of the latent data-generating states. The degree of partial124
knowledge about latent states is assumed to reflect the precision of neural data that informs the analysis. When125
a neural measure or measures are perfectly predictive of the latent generating states, the partition of behavioral126
data to one latent state or another mirrors the data-generating process, and the model that assumes a mixture of127
latent generating states will be preferred over the (misspecified) model that marginalizes over latent states. As the128
strength of the relationship between the neural measure and the partition in behavioral data weakens, we ought129
to obtain less evidence for the model that assumes a mixture of latent states in data. Our primary aim is to130
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determine the amount of noise that can be tolerated in the relationship between neural and behavioral data before131
the misspecified model that collapses across the (true) latent states is preferred. Our outcome measure of interest132
is, therefore, the probability with which we select the model that assumes more than one latent generating state in133
data, which was the true data-generating model in all cases.134
1.1. Diffusion Model of Speeded Decision-Making135
In all simulations we studied sequential sampling models of decision-making, and the diffusion model of136
speeded decision-making in particular (Forstmann et al., 2016; Ratcliff and McKoon, 2008; Smith and Ratcliff,137
2004). The diffusion model, as with most sequential sampling models, assumes that simple decisions are made138
through a gradual process of accumulating sensory information from the environment. The sensory information139
influences an evidence counter that tracks support for one response alternative over another; for example, whether140
a motion stimulus moves to the left or right of a display, or whether a string of letters represents a word or not.141
The evidence counter continues to track evidence for the two response alternatives until it crosses an absorbing142
boundary – a pre-determined threshold amount of evidence – which triggers a response. The predicted choice is143
determined by the boundary that was crossed, and the predicted response time is the time taken for the process to144
reach the boundary plus a fixed offset time to account for processes such as encoding the stimulus and producing145
a motor response (e.g., a button press).146
Figure 1 provides a schematic overview of a choice between leftward and rightward motion in the diffusion147
decision model. The model has four core processing parameters: the starting point of evidence accumulation, which148
can implement biases toward one response or another (z); the average rate at which information is extracted from the149
stimulus, known as the drift rate (v), the amount of evidence required for a response, which represents cautiousness150
in responding, known as boundary separation (a); and the time required for elements outside the decision process,151
known as non-decision time (Ter). Modern implementations of the diffusion model assume trial-to-trial variability in152
some model parameters to reflect the assumption that performance has systematic and nonsystematic components153
over the course of an experiment (Ratcliff and Tuerlinckx, 2002). These parameters include the drift rate, starting154
point, and non-decision time. Specifically, on trial i the drift rate is sampled from a Gaussian distribution with155
mean v and standard deviation η, vi ∼ N(v, η); the start point is sampled from a uniform distribution with range156
sz, zi ∼ U(z − sz2 , z +
sz
2 ); and the non-decision time is sampled from a uniform distribution with range st,157
Ter,i ∼ U(Ter − st2 , Ter +
st
2 ).158
In all cases we simulated data from a hypothetical experiment of a two-alternative forced choice task with159
a single condition. The use of a single experimental condition mirrors almost all laboratory-based studies of mind160
wandering, which tend to focus on vigilance tasks such as the sustained attention to respond task (SART; Robertson161
et al., 1997; Smallwood and Schooler, 2006; Smilek et al., 2010). The SART is typically implemented as a single-162
condition go/no-go task with infrequent no-go stimuli (i.e., stimuli requiring a response to be withheld), with the163




























Figure 1: Schematic representation of the diffusion model of speeded-decision making. Reproduced with permission from Hawkins et al.
(2015).
generalizable to experimental paradigms with partial response time data – such as go/no-go and stop-signal tasks165
(Gomez et al., 2007; Logan et al., 2014) – so the results reported here are relevant to the tasks and experimental166
paradigms typically studied in the mind wandering literature.167
Our primary aim was to identify the latent data-generating states in data. This is a question pertinent to168
the individual-participant level – when was the participant on-task, and when were they off-task – thus we simulate169
and fit models to data at the individual-participant level.170
2. Discrete State Representation171
2.1. Generating Synthetic Data172
Synthetic data were generated from the discrete state representation by assuming that 80% of trials were173
from the on-task state and the remaining 20% of trials were from the off-task state. One could manipulate the ratio174
of on-task to off-task trials as a parameter of the model recovery exercise. We chose instead to select a fixed value175
that might be considered a conservative estimate of reported rates of mind wandering in experimental tasks that176
mirror the setup of our simulated experiment, so as to not overstate the estimated power of our results (e.g., some177
have reported that mind wandering occurs between 30–50% of the time; Killingsworth and Gilbert, 2010).1178
1Nevertheless, to assure ourselves that our results were not dependent on the ratio of on-task to off-task trials and the parameter
settings described below, we conducted a parallel analysis where synthetic data were generated from a discrete state representation with
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In generating synthetic data we constrained the parameters of the on-task and off-task states to identical179
values, except for the magnitude of the drift rate. We made the plausible assumption that the drift rate for the180
on-task state was larger than the drift rate for the off-task state, which implies that mind wandering reduces the181
efficiency of information processing. This assumption is consistent with empirical results suggesting that mind182
wandering leads to slower and more variable response times with a greater error rate (e.g., Bastian and Sackur,183
2013; Cheyne et al., 2009), which is qualitatively similar to the effect of a reduction in drift rate. Specifically, we184
set the drift rate for the on-task state to von = 2 and the off-task state to voff = 1. All other parameters were185
set to the following values, for both states: a = 1, z = .5 (i.e., no response bias), Ter = .15s, η = 1, and the186
trial-to-trial variability parameters for the start point of evidence accumulation and non-decision time were both187
set to 0. The diffusion coefficient was fixed to s = 1 in all synthetic data and model fits were obtained using the188
‘rtdists’ package for the R programming environment (Singmann et al., 2016). An exemplary synthetic data set is189
shown in Figure 2a and 2b. The synthetic data of the on-task state differed to the off-task state in terms of higher190
accuracy and faster mean response times that were less variable. These differences indicate that there was a reliable191
signal in behavioral data that differentiated the latent states.192
We generated synthetic data across a wide range of sample sizes (i.e., number of trials completed by a193
synthetic participant). Our motivation was to determine the efficiency of neural data to identify discrete latent194
states using sample sizes considered very small for fitting sequential sampling models to data, through to an195
approximate asymptotic limit with very large sample sizes. Specifically, we simulated 200 synthetic data sets from196
each of sample sizes 100, 250, 500, 1000, 2000, 5000, and 10000 trials. Therefore, for sample sizes of 100 trials, for197
example, there were 80 ‘on-task’ and 20 ‘off-task’ trials, and for 10000 trials there were 8000 ‘on-task’ and 2000198
‘off-task’ trials.199
2.2. Model Specification200
We fit two types of diffusion models to each synthetic data set: a single-state and a dual-state model. In201
the Appendix we outline the steps involved in performing an analysis assuming a discrete state representation and202
provide accompanying R code (R Core Team, 2016) that uses the rtdists package (Singmann et al., 2016).203
2.2.1. Single-State Model204
The single-state model is a misspecified model in the sense that it marginalizes (collapses) over trials gener-205
ated from the on-task and off-task latent states; this approach is equivalent to not using any neural data to inform206
cognitive modeling. The single-state modeling is representative of the dominant approach in the literature that207
an equal ratio of on-task to off-task trials and a lower drift rate for the on-task state (von = 1.8). Following (4) and (5), these settings
give an equivalent effect size to that reported in the primary simulation. All results of the parallel analysis mirror those shown in the
left panel of Figure 3. Combined with the results shown in Figure 4, this finding suggests that the primary factor influencing recovery of
the true latent generating state is the size of the effect that the neural data exert on the latent state, and not particular data-generating













































Figure 2: An exemplary synthetic data set generated from the on-task and off-task states of the dual-state model (panels a and b), and
the fit of the single-state model to the same data set, collapsed over latent states (panel c). Response time distributions for correct
responses are shown to the right of zero and distributions for error responses are shown to the left of zero (i.e., mirrored around the
zero-point on the x-axis). Green and red lines show correct and error responses, respectively, from the posterior predictive distribution
of the single-state model (panel c). The probability of a correct response in synthetic data is denoted p, and the corresponding predicted
probability from the single-state model is denoted p̂ (panel c).
generally makes no attempt to account for potential task-unrelated thoughts and their effects on task performance.208
The single-state model freely estimated the following parameters from data: start point (z), trial-to-trial variability209
in start point (sz), boundary separation (a), drift rate (v), trial-to-trial variability in drift rate (η), and non-decision210
time (Ter). Trial-to-trial variability in non-decision time was fixed to st = 0. We made this decision as we deemed it211
unlikely that the parameter estimation routine would compensate for the misspecification of the single-state model212
with a change in the parameter reflecting non-decision time variability, and our Bayesian parameter estimation213
routines were computationally much more feasible without the numerical integration required for estimation of the214
st parameter.215
2.2.2. Dual-State Model216
The dual-state model acknowledged the on-task and off-task generating states in data, by allowing for217
differences in drift rate between trials allocated to the on-task and off-task states (i.e., freely estimated von and218
voff , respectively). All other model parameters were constrained to be equal across the two states (as in the219
single-state model, st = 0 was fixed everywhere). The dual-state model, therefore, assumed some knowledge of the220
8
data-generating structure in that there were two states that differed only in drift rate. Our results can thus be221
interpreted as a ‘best case’ scenario; additional misspecification in free parameters across the discrete states, or in222
the number of discrete states, may worsen model recovery relative to the single-state model.223
We did, however, introduce misspecification to the dual-state model in terms of the reliability with which224
trials were allocated to the true generating state. That is, we systematically manipulated the probability that225
trials generated from the on-task state were in the set of trials allocated to the on-task state in the fitted model,226
and similarly for the off-task state. In the sense that the set of trials generated from the on-task state was not227
necessarily the same set of trials fitted as the ‘on-task’ state, this model is misspecified. We refer to this form228
of misspecification as state-level misspecification, which is distinct from parameter misspecification (i.e., allowing229
the wrong parameters to vary with state). State-level misspecification mimics the capacity for an external stream230
of information, such as a neural data, to reliably partition trials into the true (data-generating) latent state. For231
example, Mittner et al. (2014) trained a support vector machine to use a range of fMRI and pupil measurements to232
classify trials from a stop-signal paradigm to on-task or off-task states. Their classifier achieved expected accuracy233
of 79.7% (relative to self-reported mind-wandering), implying that they could expect to correctly classify four out234
of every five trials to the on-task or off-task states, assuming there was a true distinction in the two latent states in235
the data-generating process.236
Although it is likely that our simulated neural data leads to better-than-chance classification accuracy, no237
combination of neural measures will achieve 100% accuracy. To explore the effect of classification accuracy on238
recovery of the (true) dual-state model, we manipulated state-level misspecification in terms of the probability of239
correctly assigning a trial to its true generating state, which we denote pcorrect. For example, pcorrect = .8 indicates240
that every trial that was generated from the on-task state had .8 probability of being correctly assigned to the241
on-task state in the fitted model, and .2 probability of incorrect assignment to the off-task state in the fitted model.242
The reverse was also assumed: trials generated from the off-task state had .8 probability of assignment to the243
off-task state in the fitted model, and .2 probability of assignment to the on-task state. This value mimics the244
classification accuracy achieved in Mittner et al. (2014). We explored a range from pcorrect = .5 (the neural data245
provide no information about the latent state, so trials are randomly allocated to the on- or off-task state) through246
to pcorrect = 1 (the neural data provide perfect knowledge of the generating state), in increments of .05. Therefore,247
for each synthetic data set, we compared the fit of the single-state model to 11 dual-state models corresponding to248
the range in pcorrect. For each value of pcorrect we determined which model (single state, dual state) provided the249
most parsimonious account of the synthetic data set.250
2.3. Parameter Estimation251
We sampled from the joint posterior distribution of the parameters of each model using differential evolution
Markov chain Monte Carlo (Turner et al., 2013b). We assumed prior distributions that had a considerable range
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around, but conveyed relatively little information about, the true data-generating parameter values:
v [single-state] ∼ N(0, 2,−5, 5),
von, voff [dual-state] ∼ N(0, 2,−5, 5),
a, sv ∼ N(1, 1, 0, 2),
z, sz, Ter ∼ Beta(1, 1),
where N(µ, σ, a, b) denotes a Normal distribution with mean µ, standard deviation σ, truncated to a lower limit of252
a and upper limit of b, and Beta(α, β) denotes the Beta distribution with shape parameters α and β. Parameters253
z and sz were estimated as a proportion of parameter a, and hence were constrained to the unit interval.254
Independently for all models, we initialized 18 chains with random samples from the prior distribution.255
Chains were first run for 250 iterations with the differential evolution probability of migration set to .05. Once256
initialization was complete, the migration probability was set to zero and we sampled from the joint posterior257
distribution of the parameters in phases of 1000 iterations. After each phase we checked chain convergence using258
the multivariate potential scale reduction factor (R̂ statistic; Brooks and Gelman, 1998), using a criterion of R̂ < 1.15259
to indicate convergence (visual inspection of a sample of chains supported this conclusion).2 After each phase of 1000260
iterations we monitored whether the chains had converged. If so, the parameter estimation routine was terminated.261
If not, another 1000 iterations were started from the end point of the previous 1000 iterations, and the procedure262
repeated until the chains had converged.263
2.4. Model Selection264
Model selection was performed with the Deviance Information Criterion (DIC; Spiegelhalter et al., 2002)3,265
which is computed using samples from the joint posterior parameter distribution. DIC is defined as DIC = D(θ) +266
2pD, where D(θ) is the deviance at the mean of the sampled posterior parameter vector θ, and pD is the effective267
number of model parameters, where pD = D−D(θ), and D is the mean of the sampled posterior parameter deviance268
values. Lower values of DIC indicate the better model for the data (i.e., the most parsimonious tradeoff between269
goodness of fit and model complexity).270
We converted estimated DICs for each comparison of the single- and dual-state models to model weights271
(for overview, see Wagenmakers and Farrell, 2004). If the set of models under consideration contain the true272
data-generating model, then these weights provide estimates of the posterior probability of each model (i.e., the273
2Preliminary simulations indicated lower values of R̂ (e.g,. R̂ < 1.1) were produced by longer series, but without any change in
conclusions; we chose a length of 1000 as a compromise that kept computational demands feasible.
3DIC has been criticized because it can select models that are too complex. Gelman et al. (2014) favor instead an information
criterion that approximates Bayesian leave-one-out cross validation, WAIC (Watanabe, 2013); for a number of checks we performed on
our extensive simulation study DIC and WAIC produced almost identical results. The code we provide to apply our analyses allows
calculation of both information criteria, so users can use their preferred choice.
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probability conditional on the data of each model being the true model relative to the set of candidate models274
under comparison). Otherwise, model weights provide a graded measure of evidence rather than the all-or-none275
decision rule that can arise when interpreting ‘raw’ information criteria. Model weights are also on the same scale276
for different data-set sizes (i.e., they fall on the unit interval), which allowed for simple comparison of model recovery277
across the sample sizes that were systematically manipulated in our study.278
Model weights are calculated by first considering differences in DIC for each model fit to a given data279
set: ∆i(DIC) = DICi −min DIC, where min DIC is the lowest (i.e., best) DIC among the set of K models under280
















We calculated model weights for pairwise comparisons between the single- and dual-state models. All synthetic282
data were generated from the dual-state model so our primary outcome measure was the weight in favor of the283




















We calculated model weights according to (2) for all relevant comparisons, and then averaged over the 200 Monte285
Carlo replicates within each state-level misspecification (.5, .55, ..., .95, 1) by sample size (100, 250, 500, 1000, 2000,286
5000, 10000) cell of the design.287
2.5. Results and Discussion288
The single- and dual-state models provided an excellent fit to all synthetic data sets. Figure 2c shows the289
fit of the single-state model to an exemplary synthetic data set. It is perhaps surprising, but also instructive, that290
the misspecified single-state model provided such a precise account of data generated from two discrete latent states291
that had different data-generating parameters. It appears that the single-state model is able to mimic the dual-state292
model, at least for the parameter settings we investigated. Specifically, when the drift rate is the only parameter293
that varies across discrete states – where von and voff , respectively, represent drift rates for the on-task and off-task294
states, and pon represents the proportion of on-task trials – the estimated (single) drift rate of the misspecified295
single-state model approximates a weighted combination of the two: von × pon + voff × (1 − pon). To mimic the296
variability of the mixture of drift rate distributions – which is increasingly greater than the variability of either of297
the mixture components as the two means increasingly differ – there is an increase in the standard deviation of298
the trial-to-trial variability in drift rate (η) estimate for the single-state model. For the difference in drift rates299
that we investigated this increase was only marginal, and the slightly more variable single drift rate distribution300
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approximated the mixture distribution quite well (see also discussion around formulae (4) and (5) below). This301
approximation will likely break down as the difference in means becomes extreme, but as the difference we examined302
was quite substantial it seems unlikely that visual examination of goodness-of-fit alone would be sufficient in practice303
to detect a misspecified single-state model.304
Since both models provided a visually compelling fit to behavioral data, we discriminated between the305
single- and dual-state models on the basis of model weights, as is standard in most research comparing competing306
cognitive models. The left panel of Figure 3 summarizes the model recovery simulation. The weight in favor307
of the dual-state model – the true data-generating model – is shown on the y-axis. Light through to dark lines308
indicate the amount of state-level misspecification, where classification to the true latent state was manipulated309
from chance performance (pcorrect = .5, lightest line) through to perfect classification (pcorrect = 1, darkest line).310
The key comparison is the ability to identify the true latent generating state on the basis of cognitive models fit to311
behavioral data, across a range of neurally-informed classification accuracies.312



























































































Figure 3: Model recovery for medium effect sizes. The left panel shows the weight in favor of the dual-state model over the single-state
model in the model recovery simulations of the discrete state representation. The y-axis represents the DIC-derived posterior model
probability of the dual-state model, the x-axis represents the number of trials in the synthetic data set, and color gradations represent
the range in pcorrect of the state-level misspecification of the dual-state model. The right panel shows the weight in favor of the covariate
model over the standard model in the model recovery simulations of the continuous dimension representation. The y-axis represents
the DIC-derived posterior model probability of the covariate model and color gradations represent the range in R2 of the covariate
measurement precision of the covariate model. Horizontal gray lines indicate the point of equivalent evidence between the two models
(solid lines), and a difference of approximately 3 DIC units in favor of the dual-state model (left) and covariate model (right; upper
dashed lines) or the single-state model (left) and standard model (right; lower dashed lines).
As expected, evidence in favor of the dual-state model increased as the number of trials in the synthetic313
data increased (larger values on the x-axis). This was, however, heavily influenced by the amount of state-level314
misspecification. In our simulations, this represents the capacity of the neural data to reliably classify trials to their315
true latent (data-generating) state. Whenever state-level misspecification was above chance (i.e., pcorrect > .5), the316
evidence in favor of the dual-state model increased with increasing sample size. In particular, it reached ceiling317
by a sample size of 1000 trials when state-level misspecification was completely absent (pcorrect = 1), and by318
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the upper limit of the sample sizes we explored (10000 trials) for moderate classification accuracy (pcorrect ≥ .7).319
For more plausible sample sizes, however, recovery of the true model was more modest. Even with no state-level320
misspecification, the weight for the dual-state model never exceeded .8 for sample sizes less than 250 trials. We321
note that a model weight of .8 corresponds to a difference of approximately 3 units on the raw DIC scale. Small322
differences in information criteria such as this are often considered as providing little more than weak evidence (e.g.,323
Burnham and Anderson, 2004; Kass and Raftery, 1995; Raftery, 1995). Even placing optimistic bounds on the level324
of classification accuracy that is possible with real neural data (e.g., pcorrect = .9), the weight for the dual-state325
model only exceeded .8 at a sample size of approximately 400 trials, and did not reach a decisive level of evidence326
until the sample size exceeded 1000 trials.327
On a more technical point, when state-level misspecification was at chance (pcorrect = .5), the single-state328
model ideally ought to garner increasing evidence with increasing sample size (i.e., a gradual shift toward lower329
values on the y-axis). This should occur since the classification to discrete states in the fitted model was completely330
uninformed by the true data-generating values, so the estimated drift rates for trials classified to the on- and off-task331
states were close to identical. Under these conditions, the dual-state model provides no predictive benefit over the332
single-state model, so we should favor the simpler single-state model, and increasingly so for larger sample sizes.333
Examination of Figure 3, however, indicates that this did not occur; model weight was independent of sample size.334
This result is due to a property of the model selection criteria used here. DIC penalizes model complexity with a335
fixed offset (the effective number of parameters, pD), which means that the penalty against the dual-state model336
over the single-state model when pcorrect = .5 is (almost) a fixed value as a function of the sample size manipulation337
in our study, hence the approximately flat line at y = .4. This problem would be addressed through the use of338
model selection indices that are consistent in the sense that they converge to the true answer with increasing sample339
size, such as Bayes factors. At the time of this work, calculation of Bayes factors for complex cognitive models340
such as the diffusion model is computationally extremely expensive. This is an active field of research and with341
future developments we hope to incorporate such model selection measures in our work (for a recent example, see342
Steingroever et al., 2016).343
In summary, our simulation study indicates that it can be difficult to identify discrete latent states on344
the basis of cognitive models fit to behavioral data. Of course, it is possible that changes to the parameters of345
the simulation may alter these results. For example, we could manipulate the ratio of on-task to off-task trials in346
synthetic data, the number of model parameters that differed across the latent states and the degree of difference, or347
the level of parameter misspecification in the models fit to the synthetic data. On the basis of the available evidence,348
however, we conclude that obtaining compelling evidence for the identification of mutually exclusive latent states –349
such as phases of on-task and off-task performance – requires very large sample sizes (5000+ trials) with moderate350
(or better) neural classifiers, or moderate (or better) sample sizes with very good neural classifiers. Our intuition is351
that neither of these situations arise in the majority of real psychological or neuroscience experiments. Nevertheless,352
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for almost all sample sizes we obtained at least some evidence in favor of the true model for plausible sample sizes353
(e.g., a few hundred to a few thousand trials) when data were partitioned to discrete states on the basis of neural354
classifiers that performed within an impressive but plausible range for real data (e.g., pcorrect = .7− .85).355
3. Continuous Dimension Representation356
The first model recovery analysis indicated that identifying discrete latent states on the basis of cognitive357
models fit to behavioral data is difficult but not impractical. We now investigate a generalization of the discrete358
state representation that considers the latent state as a continuous dimension. In the context of mind wandering,359
such a continuum could represent a dynamically fluctuating state where people drift into phases of more on-task or360
more off-task focus, without imposing a rigid boundary between mutually exclusive states. The idea underlying the361
continuous dimension representation is more general, though, mirroring constructs in many cognitive theories, such362
as the graded memorability of different items in a recognition memory experiment. Indeed, it was to account for363
just such graded variability that Ratcliff (1978) introduced trial-to-trial variability in drift rates into the diffusion364
model, which has since become a standard assumption (i.e., η > 0).365
The continuous dimension representation can be interpreted in two ways. The first assumes that there is an366
external stream of information, which we assume throughout to be some form of neural data, that reliably indexes367
a latent state, such as mind wandering. In the mind wandering literature, for example, measures of connectivity368
and activity of the default mode network are increased during phases of reduced attention toward the primary task369
(e.g., Andrews-Hanna et al., 2010; Christoff et al., 2009; Mason et al., 2007; Mittner et al., 2014; for meta-analysis,370
see Fox et al., 2015). In this case, moment-to-moment fluctuations in activity of the default mode network could be371
considered an online index of mind wandering. This stream of neural data can then be used as a covariate in the372
cognitive model; specifically, single-trial measures of default mode network activity can be regressed onto structured373
trial-by-trial variation in the parameters of the model. This allows exploration of the effect of the neural covariate374
on different model parameters and permits quantitative tests of the covariate-parameter pairings that provide the375
best fit to behavioral data. This approach has the potential to provide insights regarding how the latent state (e.g.,376
mind wandering as indexed by activity of the default mode network) affects cognition (e.g., processing efficiency;377
drift rate) and consequent task performance (e.g., more errors, slower response times).378
The second way to interpret a continuous dimension is that the neural measure provides a direct ‘readout’379
of a process assumed in the cognitive model. This approach allows for precise tests of ‘linking propositions’ (Schall,380
2004); explicit hypotheses about the nature of the mapping from particular neural states to particular cognitive381
states. As an example of this approach, Cavanagh et al. (2011) proposed that response caution in conflict tasks is382
modulated by connectivity between the subthalamic nucleus and medial prefrontal cortex. To test this hypothesis,383
the authors first estimated single-trial measures of theta band power from neural oscillations in ongoing EEG activity384
over the medial prefrontal cortex, which was then regressed onto the value of the decision boundary parameter of385
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the diffusion model. This single-trial regressor approach estimates regression coefficients that indicate the valence386
and magnitude of the relationship between the neural measure and observed performance, via the architecture of387
the cognitive model. Cavanagh et al. (2011) found that increased theta power led to a subsequent increase in the388
decision boundary (i.e., a positive value of the regression coefficient) for trials with high but not low conflict. A389
control analysis indicated that theta power had no trial-level relationship with drift rate (i.e., a regression coefficient390
centered at zero), indicating a selective effect of the neural measure on a model parameter. This example highlights391
how single-trial regression permits quantitative tests of hypotheses about brain-behavior relationships.392
Regressing neural data onto the parameters of cognitive models at the single-trial level has the desirable393
property that it provides a tight quantitative link between neural and behavioral data (de Hollander et al., 2016).394
Furthermore, although we used custom scripts for all analyses reported here – because we needed to automate a395
large number of replications – there are excellent, freely available programs that implement single-trial regression396
for hierarchical and non-hierarchical Bayesian parameter estimation for the diffusion model (HDDM toolbox for397
Python; Wiecki et al., 2013), which removes barriers to implementation of these methods. In the Appendix we398
outline the steps involved in performing single-trial regression and provide accompanying R code to implement399
these steps.400
In this section we assessed whether the trial-by-trial influence of an external stream of information, such401
as a neural measure, is identifiable in models fit to behavioral data. In previous simulation studies, Wiecki et al.402
(2013) found that single-trial covariates are well recovered in a hierarchical estimation setting for moderate effects403
sizes and moderate number of trials in the experiment. We build on Wiecki et al.’s findings to explore how often a404
model that incorporates a single-trial neural covariate – which was the true model in all cases – was preferred over405
the ‘standard’ diffusion model that uses no trial-level covariates.406
3.1. Generating Synthetic Data407
Synthetic data were generated from a diffusion model where a neural signal modulated individual-trial drift408
rates: trials with larger-than-average neural signals had larger-than-average drift rates and trials with smaller-409
than-average neural signals had smaller-than-average drift rates. We assumed that the neural covariate would be410
pre-processed and normalized prior to modeling. To this end, we simulated a single value of the neural covariate for411
every synthetic trial via random draws from the standard normal distribution and explored the effect of the neural412
covariate on recovery of the data-generating model.413
3.1.1. Covariate Model414
Synthetic data were generated data from a model that assumed trial-to-trial variability in drift rate had415
systematic fluctuations, via the neural covariate, and unsystematic (random) fluctuations, via parameter η, which416
we refer to as the Covariate model. We assumed that the trial-level neural covariate was mapped via simple linear417
regression to structured trial-by-trial variation in drift rate. Specifically, drift rates were distributed according to418
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the value of the normalized covariate (d) and a regression coefficient (β), such that the drift rate (v) on trial i is:419
vi ∼ v + β · di +N(0, η). (3)
The covariate model thus assumed that the drift rate on trial i, vi, had a mean component defined as a linear420
function of an intercept, v, representing average performance in the experiment, and the magnitude and valence421
of the neural measure on trial i, di, scaled by a regression coefficient, β, which is an index of effect size, and a422
random component involving samples from a Gaussian distribution with mean 0 and standard deviation η. This423
model reflects the plausible assumption that our measured neural covariate has a generative influence on drift424
rate (through parameter β), but there are also unmeasured, randomly distributed influences on drift rate (through425
parameter η).426
3.1.2. Effect Size of the Neural Covariate427
We matched the effect size (β) studied in the continuous dimension representation to the effect size studied428
in the discrete state simulations in terms of the proportion of variance accounted for by the neural information.429
Specifically, if pon represents the proportion of on-task trials in the discrete state representation, and x1 and x2430
respectively represent sampled drift rates of the on-task and off-task states, where x1 ∼ N(von, ηon) and x2 ∼431
N(voff , ηoff ), then the weighted mean drift rate of the mixture is432
Mdiscrete = pon · von + (1− pon) · voff , (4)
with variance433
Vdiscrete = pon · η2on + (1− pon) · η2off + pon · (von −Mdiscrete)2 + (1− pon) · (voff −Mdiscrete)2. (5)
Substituting the values used in the discrete state simulations (pon = .8, von = 2, voff = 1, and ηon = ηoff = 1)
into (4) and (5) we get Mdiscrete = 1.8 and Vdiscrete = 1.16. The proportion of variance accounted for by the neural







which gives the medium effect size of rdiscrete =
√
R2discrete = .371.434
We used a comparable definition of effect size for the continuous dimension representation. If the neural
data is distributed as d ∼ N(0, Vneural) with regression coefficient β and base drift rate variability x ∼ N(0, η),4
4Here we set Vneural = 1 without loss of generality and similarly both means at zero as we are only concerned with proportions of
variance.
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then it follows that the covariate model in (3) has variance




η + β · Vneural
. (6)
Rearranging (6) and setting R2continuous = R
2





which is the value of the regression coefficient we used to generate synthetic data. This value is broadly representative436
of the few previous studies that have reported single-trial regression coefficients in empirical studies using a model-437
based neuroscience framework; β ≈ .20 for drift rate effects in Nunez et al. (in press), and β ≈ .09 and .04 for438
response threshold effects in Cavanagh et al. (2011) and Frank et al. (2015), respectively. All other parameters of the439
covariate model were set to the same values as in the simulation of the on-task state of the discrete representation.440
We again generated synthetic data sets from the same range of sample sizes as in the previous analysis; 200441
synthetic data sets from the covariate model for each of sample sizes 100, 250, 500, 1000, 2000, 5000, and 10000442
trials.443
3.2. Model Specification444
We fit two types of diffusion models to each synthetic data set: the covariate model and a ‘standard’
model. The covariate model was fit to all synthetic data sets with the drift rate assumptions specified in (3). The
second model neglected the information contained in the neural covariate altogether, instead attributing trial-to-trial
variability in drift rate to unsystematic sources via the η parameter; that is,
vi ∼ N(v, η).
We refer to this second model as the Standard model, reflecting its dominant status in the literature (Ratcliff, 1978;445
Ratcliff and McKoon, 2008).446
When the neural signal is measured with perfect precision, the true latent data-generating model – the447
covariate model – should be favored over the standard model. Such high measurement precision, however, is not448
possible in real neural data. To examine the effect of noisy neural data on the identification of a model incorporating449
a neural covariate, we manipulated the level of noise in the covariate that was fit to the synthetic data. That is, we450
systematically diminished the correlation between the data-generating value of the covariate and the fitted value451
of the covariate, which we refer to as covariate measurement precision. This manipulation mimics the setup of real452
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experiments where we (aim to) obtain neural measures that are noise-perturbed proxies to the true neural state.453
To systematically manipulate covariate measurement precision, for each synthetic data set we generated a454
new set of random variables that served as the neural covariate in the models that were fit to the synthetic data.455
The set of random variables, which we refer to as ‘fitted covariates’, had correlations with the data-generating value456
of the covariate ranging from r = 0− 1 in increments of .1. The mean (zero), variance (one) and shape (normal) of457
the fitted covariates were the same as that of the covariate distribution.5458
We report covariate measurement precision below as the coefficient of determination (R2) rather than459
Pearson correlation coefficient (r). This allows for direct interpretation as the proportion of variance that the460
noise-perturbed, fitted value of the covariate accounts for in the true data-generating value of the neural covariate.461
These results provide a benchmark for the minimum level of measurement precision required for identifiability of462
cognitive models that incorporate single-trial covariates.463
3.3. Parameter Estimation and Model Selection464
We estimated model parameters using identical methods to those described in the analysis of the discrete465
state representation, with the only addition that we specified a prior distribution for the covariate parameter of the466
covariate model: N(0, 1,−3, 3).467
Model selection was also conducted in a parallel manner to the first analysis. Our primary aim was to468
determine the covariate measurement precision required to obtain evidence in favor of the covariate model over the469
standard model. Therefore, we report the model weight in favor of data generated from the covariate (i.e., true)470
model over the standard model, following (2).471
3.4. Results and Discussion472
All models provided an excellent fit to synthetic data so we again adjudicated between them using model473
weights. The right panel of Figure 3 summarizes model recovery in a similar format to the left panel. Larger values474
on the y-axis indicate more evidence for the true (covariate) model over the standard model. Line darkness indicates475
the level of covariate measurement precision, where measurement precision was manipulated from complete noise476
(R2 = 0, lightest line) through to perfect measurement (R2 = 1, darkest line). As before, the key comparison was477
5Under this model of measurement noise, the relationship to the proportion of variance in drift rates explained by mind wandering
is more transparent than in the discrete case where measurement noise is in terms of the proportion of correct classifications. To see
this, denote the proportion of variance in the measured covariate (MC) by w, and the random variables representing the systematic
effect of the covariate and measurement noise by D ∼ N(0, 1) and M ∼ N(0, 1), respectively. Hence, MC = w ·D + (1 − w) ·M , and
so MC ∼ N(0, 1) as required. Consequently, the overall drift rate random variable with the measured covariate is V ∼ v + β ·MC =
v + β ·D + N(0,
√
1 + β · (1− w)). These results show the additive Gaussian assumption causes the difference between measurement
noise and the random effects on the drift rate unrelated to the covariate not to be identifiable, with the combination constituting what
might be called the “effective” level of noise. Given, r =
√
w, our manipulation of r is a manipulation of the effective noise level,
corresponding either to a change in the level of measurement noise, the level of unrelated effects on drift rates, or some combination.
We maintain the distinction between the two constituents of effective noise in our description of results given it makes clear the link to
the discrete case, where in both cases the range of the measurement noise manipulation is between no effect and the maximal effect size
(i.e., .138 = β/(1 + β), where β = .16).
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the capacity to identify the true generating model in neurally-informed versus neurally-uninformed cognitive models478
fit to behavioral data.479
Evidence in favor of the true model generally increased with the number of trials in synthetic data. As480
expected, however, this was influenced by the level of covariate measurement precision. When the covariate was481
measured with very low precision – where the fitted value of the covariate explained less than 5% of the variation482
in the data-generating covariate – sample size had almost no influence on recovery of the true model. This implies483
that when neural data are poorly measured, or when the neural measure is only a very weak proxy to the true latent484
process, then a binary decision would select the standard model over a neurally-informed model. That is, assuming485
unsystematic across-trial variation in drift rate would be more parsimonious than regressing an overly noisy neural486
measure onto drift rate.487
Perhaps surprisingly, evidence for the true model converged very slowly as a function of sample size. Even488
when the neural covariate was perfectly measured (R2 = 1), the weight for the true model did not exceed .8 until489
almost 2000 trials were observed; the comparable sample size for the discrete state simulation was 250 trials. For490
more plausible measurement precision – say, approximately 33% – the weight for the true model exceeded .8 only491
when sample size exceeded approximately 4000 trials. This result, and similar comparisons across the panels of492
Figure 3, suggests that the discrete state approach is a more powerful use of neural data than the single-trial493
covariate approach, at least for the parameter settings and effect size explored here. That is, neural data more494
heavily constrain model recovery when used as a binary indicator of the latent state than when regressed onto495
trial-by-trial variation in model parameters.496
4. Recovering Neurally-Informed Cognitive Models When Neural Data Have A Large Effect Size497
The foregoing analyses indicate that when equated on a medium effect size, neurally-informed discrete state498
models are more reliably recovered than neurally-informed continuous dimension models. In this section we confirm499
that when endowed with a sufficiently large effect size the true model is well recovered in both the discrete state500
and continuous dimension representations. This result implies that both discrete and continuous representations501
can indeed be identified in behavioral data when the information contained in neural data relates to a sufficiently502
strong effect.503
We generated synthetic data sets where the neural data strongly identified the latent state. Specifically, for504
the continuous dimension representation we set the value of the neural covariate to β = .5, with all other parameter505
settings as described in the previous section. Following (6) this gives an effect size of r = .577. An equivalent506
effect size can be obtained in the discrete state representation in multiple ways. We chose to enhance the difference507
between the on- and off-task states in terms of a larger drift rate for the on-task state (von = 2.414) and assuming508
an equal ratio of on-task to off-task trials (pon = .5), with no changes in other data-generating parameters. All509
other details were identical to those used in the previous simulations, including the data generation, sample size,510
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introduction of noise to the (synthetic) neural data, model specification, parameter estimation, and model selection511
methods.512
Figure 4 shows recovery of the true model with a large effect size in the discrete state and continuous513
dimension representations. A striking finding was how quickly the evidence for the true models converged as a514
function of the noise in neural data (state-level misspecification and covariate measurement precision in the left and515
right panels, respectively), even at relatively small samples sizes (i.e., 250–500 trials) and moderate levels of noise.516
Although recovery of the continuous dimension representation was much improved for large versus medium effect517
sizes, the true model in the discrete state representation was still recovered more reliably when equating sample518
size and noise in neural data.519



























































































Figure 4: Model recovery for large effect sizes. The left panel shows the weight in favor of the dual-state model over the single-state
model for the discrete state representation. The right panel shows the weight in favor of the covariate model over the standard model
for the continuous dimension representation. All other details are as described in Figure 3.
5. Conclusions520
We investigated whether informing cognitive models with neural data improves the ability to identify latent521
cognitive states. This approach is increasingly common in the psychology and neuroscience literatures (e.g., Borst522
and Anderson, 2015; Mittner et al., 2014; Turner et al., 2013a, 2015). However, there have been few systematic523
studies of the benefits to model recovery that such an approach may bear. We found that, when the neural data524
can discriminate a moderate effect on performance, it can be difficult to reliably identify mutually exclusive latent525
states when neurally-informed cognitive models are applied to behavioral data. As expected, model recovery was526
very good when the synthetic experimental design was far removed from typical experiments (i.e., large sample size,527
good neural classification accuracy). Model recovery, however, was still within acceptable bounds even with more528
feasible experimental designs (i.e., between 500-1000 trials) with moderate classification accuracy.529
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In contrast, when we relaxed the assumption that latent states are discrete, we found that a latent state530
that can dynamically move along a continuous dimension substantially worsened model recovery even though mind531
wandering accounted for the same proportion of variance (i.e., had the same effect size) in the continuous and discrete532
versions. Model recovery was relatively poor for the sample sizes typically observed in psychological experiments533
(i.e., up to 1000 trials per participant), and convincing evidence for the true data-generating model was only534
obtained with sample sizes of approximately 5000 trials or more, even when neural covariates were (hypothetically)535
measured with perfect precision. This result implies that when the neural covariate is only a distant proxy to the536
true data-generating process, a standard model that is ignorant with respect to neural data will often be preferred537
over a neurally-informed cognitive model, and, within reason, this is not dependent on sample size. We believe538
this highlights two important issues in the use of neurally-informed cognitive models. The first, more obvious539
issue is that we must maximize the precision in our measurement of neural data. Birte: Following Andrew’s540
comment, is there anything you can add to accompany the previous sentence about precision of541
neural recording? The second, more subtle issue is that we must use theory-based, hypothesis-driven tests of542
neural covariates on model parameters; that is, we must aim to maximize the possible relationship between the543
fitted value of the covariate and the true data-generating process.544
Our conservative conclusion is, therefore, that neural data aids model identification under some circum-545
stances. In particular, model recovery improved when the latent state was assumed to consist of discrete stages (vs.546
continuous dimension). The discrete approach had greater power in the sense that a given effect could be identified547
with smaller sample sizes, reflecting more efficient use of neural data. This finding may be due to the parameter gov-548
erning trial-to-trial variability in drift rate (η) having a better capacity to compensate for variance arising from the549
neural covariate under the assumption of a continuous dimension than a discrete state representation. Nevertheless,550
in practice this finding is particularly important since experiments that record neural measures such as fMRI or551
EEG activity during task completion are often limited in the number of trials that can be collected. Reassuringly,552
when the neural data exerted a large effect on behavior (although not such a large effect as to be implausible at least553
in some circumstances) both the discrete state and continuous dimension representations had good model recovery.554
Even under this condition, however, relative to the standard model, the assumption of mutually exclusive latent555
data-generating states was more efficiently recovered than a latent continuous dimension (cf. Figure 4). Finally, we556
note that efficiency of model recovery appears to more heavily influenced by the effect size rather than particular557
hyperparameter settings (cf. footnote 1).558
It is also important to note that even in the large effect size case simple visual inspection of model fits was559
not sufficient to reject the standard model; we required model selection methods. Fortunately, methods that are560
easily implemented based on standard Bayesian posterior sampling (e.g., DIC, WAIC) sufficed for detecting the561
presence of an effect of mind wandering in our simulations. However, more sophisticated model selection methods562
(e.g., Bayes factors) appear to be required to provide consistent evidence (i.e., evidence that becomes stronger as563
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sample size increases) against the presence of mind wandering. That is, when mind wandering is not present, at564
best the model selection methods explored here will be equivocal even with large samples.565
Regardless of whether one expects neural data to exert a small or large effect on performance, the assumption566
of a discrete or continuous representation will likely better serve different research goals at different times. Both567
approaches allow estimation of effect size (cf. formulae 4–6). The continuous approach also has the attractive568
property that a measure of effect size is directly estimated. That is, the output of the neural covariate-model569
parameter relationship – a regression coefficient – has a simple interpretation (assuming that the neural covariate570
is normalized): the extent to which the estimated regression coefficient differs to zero provides a standardized571
measure of effect size. Both approaches are also relatively easy to implement. The discrete state representation can572
be implemented by splitting an experimental condition into discrete sets of trials on the basis of a neural variable573
(e.g., the output of a classifier). Single-trial covariates are already incorporated as a standard feature of some574
estimation programs (e.g., HDDM, Wiecki et al., 2013), removing a potential barrier to implementation. In the575
Appendix we also provide custom R code to implement both analysis approaches discussed in this paper.576
Our analyses examined recovery of latent cognitive states in individual (simulated) participants, though577
one could also consider recovery of latent states across groups of participants. This could be investigated with578
hierarchical Bayesian models that, among other benefits, allow for simultaneous analysis at the level of individuals579
and groups (for an overview, see Lee, 2011). Such an approach allows information to be pooled across participants in580
a theoretically sensible manner, which can confer benefits to parameter estimation, in particular parameter stability.581
Furthermore, hierarchical Bayesian modelling can be applied to large samples of participants, where each participant582
may only complete a moderate number of trials. However, it is important to note that if there are too few data for583
each participant then individual differences cannot be estimated, with hierarchical models often displaying “over-584
shrinkage” (i.e., estimating the same parameter value for all participants). For simplicity, we restricted our analyses585
to the simpler case of recovering latent cognitive states in individual participants, which removes at least some586
sources of variability that are present in the hierarchical case (e.g., across-participant variability in the proportion587
of trials from each of two discrete latent states). We leave these interesting questions about model recovery in588
hierarchical settings to future research.589
Finally, we note that the discrete and continuous approaches need not involve neural data, although we590
considered such hypothetical scenarios here. A variable derived at the level of single trials – which can be incor-591
porated within a discrete or continuous approach – can be extracted from any property of the task environment592
that is relevant to performance. For example, Hawkins et al. (2016) studied the similarity between study and test593
items in an inductive reasoning task. The similarity relations are specified at the level of individual items, and thus594
can be regressed against parameters of the cognitive model in the same manner as neural data. In Hawkins et al.’s595
model, regressing single-trial item similarity onto the drift rate parameter led to a positive regression coefficient,596
indicating that as item similarity increased so too did the probability of generalizing a target property to novel597
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items according to a particular functional form. This example illustrates the general point that wider incorporation598
of single-trial properties of the experiment – neural or otherwise – in cognitive models has the potential to provide599
deeper insight to a broad range of psychological phenomena.600
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Appendix A. Implementing Neurally-Informed Cognitive Models601
In this Appendix we outline the steps involved in implementing the discrete state and continuous dimension602
representations discussed in the main text. To accompany the examples, we provide code in the R programming603
language (R Core Team, 2016) that is freely available on the Open Science Framework (osf.io/yt8q4).604
This outline provides guidance on the cognitive modeling component of a model-based neuroscience analysis605
in real data. It assumes that the neural data – whether it is fMRI, EEG, MEG, pupil measurements, or others –606
have been analyzed in an appropriate manner. It further assumes that it is possible to extract at least one value of607
the analyzed neural measure for each trial of the experiment.608
Appendix A.1. Implementing the Discrete State Representation609
The discrete state representation assumes that the observed data were generated by two or more discrete610
latent states. In the main text, for example, we hypothesized that two latent states underlying task performance611
might correspond to an on-task state, where attention is directed to external stimuli such as an experimental task,612
or an off-task state, where attention is directed to internal stimuli such as mind wandering; these two states have613
been proposed in the popular perceptual decoupling hypothesis of mind wandering (Smallwood and Schooler, 2015).614
One could also hypothesize more than two discrete states; for example, Cheyne et al. (2009) hypothesized a three-615
state model of engagement/disengagement from task performance. However, for simplicity, we restricted the model616
recovery analyses in the main text and the outline here to the more prominent two-state case.617
The partition of individual trials into the latent states can be derived from neural data in two main ways:618
using single measures, or multiple measures.619
Appendix A.1.1. Identifying Discrete Latent States From A Single Neural Measure620
Step 1: The first method begins with identification of a neural signal related to the latent states of interest.621
In the mind wandering literature, for example, activity of the default mode network (DMN) tends to increase during622
phases of off-task focus and decrease during phases of on-task focus (Andrews-Hanna et al., 2010; Christoff et al.,623
2009; Mason et al., 2007; Mittner et al., 2014; for meta-analysis, see Fox et al., 2015). In this case, the neural signal624
of interest could be a single-trial measure of DMN activity. The neural signal of interest can be simple in the sense625
that it involves a single measure (e.g., stimulus evoked pupil response, P3 ERP component over parietal cortex,626
or BOLD response in dorsolateral prefrontal cortex) or ‘complex’ in the sense that it involves an amalgamation627
of numerous measures (e.g., connectivity between various cortical regions); the key requirement is that a single628
value of the neural signal can be extracted for each trial (methods corresponding to multiple neural signals on each629
trial are discussed in the following subsection). The specifics for obtaining a single value on each trial might differ630
depending on the domain of study and the latent states of interest; it could be the value of the neural signal in a631
one second interval during the pre-stimulus period, immediately post-stimulus presentation, the full time course of632
a trial, or some other relevant interval.633
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Step 2: Once a single value of the neural signal is obtained for each trial, the individual trials are sorted in634
order of those with the lowest value of the neural signal (e.g., low DMN activity) through to those with the highest635
value of the neural signal (e.g., high DMN activity). Once sorted, the trials are split into separate groups. A simple636
option is to perform a median split of the DMN activity-sorted trials on the assumption that trials with lower DMN637
activity are more likely to have been generated by the on-task state and those with higher DMN activity are more638
likely to have been generated by the off-task state. A median split is a coarse approach and other methods can be639
used; for example, taking the lower 40% and upper 40% of trials, or using signs of bimodality in the distribution of640
the neural signal as an indicator of the appropriate cut point for the sorted trials. The key requirement is that the641
neural signal is used to split individual trials into at least two discrete groups of trials.642
Step 3: Once the data have been split based on the neural signal, the cognitive model is fit to the discrete643
groups of trials. Critically, this fitting occurs as if the discrete groups were part of the experimental design. In the644
main text, for example, we assumed a single experimental condition with no explicit manipulation. When the data645
were split according to the neural signal, we essentially created a data set with two conditions that corresponded to646
the two latent states; we labeled these ‘on task’ and ‘off task’. When fitting the model to the latent states one can647
estimate partially overlapping or distinct sets of model parameters for the discrete states. This is the same logic648
as fitting regular experimental manipulations: when difficulty is manipulated across conditions the conventional649
approach is to freely estimate a drift rate parameter for each condition while constraining other model parameters650
to a common value. In the discrete states case, one might hypothesize that drift rate differs across conditions but651
other parameters do not. This corresponds to the assumption that the latent states only differ in the efficiency of652
stimulus information processing.653
The cognitive processes that might differ across latent states ought to be driven by theory. Ultimately,654
however, it comes down to a question of model selection; do processes A and B differ across latent states, or only655
process A? Such model comparison allows one to ask the question: if there are differences in cognitive processes656
between the latent states, what is the most likely difference? We argue that the final and most critical comparison657
is whether the simplest model of performance differences across the latent states is preferred to a model fit to data658
that is not split according to neural signal. The model recovery properties of this comparison were the primary659
focus of the main text.660
Appendix A.1.2. Identifying Discrete Latent States From Multiple Neural Measures661
The second method differs to the first in terms of the number of neural signals used to identify the latent662
cognitive states, and the complexity of the methods used to infer the latent state. The first method assumed that663
the neural signal collapsed to a single value for each trial. The second method attempts to combine multiple neural664
signals to infer the latent generating state on each trial. The general idea is that each neural signal might contain665
independent information about the latent state so simple methods of aggregation may lose discriminatory power.666
A more powerful form of aggregation is through supervised learning algorithms, though this places an additional667
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requirement on data collection to obtain the ‘labels’ for to train a classification algorithm.668
Step 1: The neural signals are extracted in a similar manner to Step 1 of Appendix A.1.1. However, here669
we assume there is a set of neural signals associated with the latent state of interest; the states might be on task670
and off task and the measures might be regional DMN activity, the task positive network, connectivity between the671
DMN and the task positive network, and stimulus evoked pupil diameter (cf. Mittner et al., 2014).672
Step 2: The general approach outlined here was performed in Mittner et al. (2014). The aim is to collect673
the neural signals identified in Step 1 and behavioral data during regular task performance that also involves674
occasional behavioral indicators of the relevant latent states. In mind wandering research, for example, participants675
are typically periodically asked to report whether their focus was ‘more on task’ or ‘more off task’ in the preceding676
trial, though this is not asked on all trials. This method takes these self-report ratings as an indicator of the latent677
state – on task or off task – and uses them as labels to train a classification algorithm to ‘learn’ the distinct patterns678
of (the collection of) neural signals that discriminate on-task from off-task self-report ratings. Once the trained and679
validated, the algorithm probabilistically classifies all unlabeled trials to the on-task or off-task state, based on the680
correspondence between the neural signals on each unlabeled trial with the neural signal on the labeled trials.681
Step 3: Once individual trials have been classified to the on-task or off-task states, the cognitive model is
fit to the discrete groups of trials in the same manner as Step 3 of Appendix A.1.1. Typical classification algorithms
used for Step 2 produce not only a latent state classification, but also a probability of correct assignment to the
state (i.e., pon and poff = 1 − pon). This uncertainty can be modeled in the liklihood function for each trial’s
data as a mixture of the likelihoods of the on-task and off-task states to account for noise in classification accuracy.
Specifically, if the data from trial i are Di and the likelihood of the set of on-task parameters given classification to
the on-task state for Di is L(θon|Di, on− task), and similarly for off-task, then:
L(θ|Di) = pon,iL(θon|Di, on− task) + poff,iL(θoff |Di, off − task)
Matthias: Are there any details that you think should be added to the machine learning682
outline? If so, can you please add some comments that detail what is missing.683
Appendix A.2. Implementing the Continuous Dimension Representation684
The continuous dimension representation assumes that the observed data were generated by a process that685
dynamically varies along a continuous latent dimension, relaxing the assumption that there are discrete latent686
states. In the context of mind wandering, for example, this approach assumes a trial will fall at some point along a687
continuum that spans from completely on-task focus through to completely off-task focus. The position along this688
latent continuum dynamically varies throughout the task.689
The aim of this method is to regress a single-trial neural signal onto structured trial-by-trial variation690
in a model parameter. Here we outline and provide code to regress a single neural signal onto a single model691
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parameter. However, the methods can be easily extended to regress multiple neural signals onto a single parameter692
(via multiple regression) or regress multiple neural signals onto multiple model parameters (via separate simple or693
multiple regressions for different model parameters).694
Step 1: The neural signal is extracted in an identical manner to Step 1 of Appendix A.1.1. For the695
analyses described in the main text and outlined here, we assume that the neural signal is normalized to a Gaussian696
distribution with mean 0 and standard deviation 1. This permits examination of simple linear relationships for the697
mapping between the neural signal and the model parameter. Other forms of regression that do not assume simple698
linear mappings are possible but we do not explore those here.699
Step 2: The hypothesized neural signal-model parameter mapping is formulated via simple linear regres-700
sion. For example, in the main text we explored a covariate model that mapped a single-trial neural signal to701
single-trial drift rates (formulae 3 of the main text). Denote the normalized neural signal d, regression coefficient702
β, and drift rate v, then the simplest covariate model for drift rate on trial i is:703
vi ∼ v + β · di (A.1)
(we also assumed across-trial variability in drift rate in the covariate model described in formulae 3 of the main704
text, which is omitted here for simplicity). This mapping assumes that the drift rate on trial i, vi, has a mean705
component – the intercept, v, representing average performance in the condition/experiment – that is modulated706
on a trial-by-trial basis by the magnitude and valence of the neural signal on trial i, di, scaled by a regression707
coefficient, β, which is an index of effect size.708
The neural signal can theoretically map to any parameter of the cognitive model of interest. When modu-709
lating single-trial parameter values it is important to ensure that the regression (A.1) does not allow any single-trial710
parameter estimates to move beyond feasible boundaries of the model (e.g., a single-trial value of the response711
threshold or non-decision time below 0). This can be instantiated with a ‘check’ in the parameter estimation712
routine that assigns very small likelihood to trials with infeasible single-trial parameter values, which results in713
low likelihood for the corresponding estimate of β. Alternatively the parameter can be transformed so that it is714
unbounded.715
Step 3: Once the single-trial regression is parameterized, the cognitive model is fit to the behavioral data.716
In addition to other model parameters, this involves estimating parameters corresponding to the mean component717
and the regression coefficient of the linear regression (v and β in A.1, respectively). The neural signal (di) is718
provided with the data. Together, these three components allow estimation of a unique drift rate for each trial (vi).719
The accompanying code provides explicit details how to compute this step.720
In the context of single-trial regression there is an added interpretational benefit to using a Bayesian721
approach to parameter estimation: if the posterior distribution of β does not contain zero there is likely a significant722
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effect of the neural signal on the model parameter. Other hypothesis tests are also possible using the posterior723
distribution, for example, estimation of the Savage-Dickey Bayes factor. Inference on β is less straightforward using724
conventional parameter estimation methods such as maximum likelihood estimation, though is still possible.725
The extent to which the estimate of the β parameter differs to 0 gives an estimate of the significance of the726
neural signal on the model parameter, and hence cognitive process of interest. For example, if we regressed single-727
trial measures of (normalized) DMN activity onto drift rate and obtained an estimate of β = −.2, this indicates728
that for each unit increase in DMN activity there was a decrease of .2 in drift rate.729
As in the discrete state analyses, the cognitive processes that might be dynamically modulated by a neural730
signal ought to be driven by theory. However, again, this comes down to a question of model selection; does the731
neural signal have a stronger single-trial effect on process A or B of the model? As before, we argue that the most732
important comparison is whether the most parsimonious single-trial regression model is preferred to a model fit to733
data that is not informed by a neural signal. The model recovery properties of this comparison were the primary734
focus of the main text.735
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